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Abstract
In North America today, we are about to embark on a significant effort to repair, or even upgrade,
many aspects of our infrastructure. Many of these efforts are linked to economic recovery packages.
Others are based on sheer need. The challenge for decision makers and planners involves ensuring
that scarce economic resources are put to their best use. Understanding the concept of fragility plays a
pivotal part in reaching that understanding.Fragility, like many other systems—particularly
Information Technology (IT ) systems—works on the concept of subjects and objects. Subjects are
those entities that seek to exploit the services (or capacity) offered by the object. Objects, on the other
hand, are those entities that deliver some good or service to the overall system. Of course, something
may act as the object in one pairing and the subject in another pairing—they are not exclusive in
nature.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss2/491
Fragility: The Next Wave in Critical  
Infrastructure Protection
Allan McDougall
in north america today, we are about to embark on a significant effort 
to repair, or even upgrade, many aspects of our infrastructure. Many of 
these efforts are linked to economic recovery packages. others are based 
on sheer need. the challenge for decision makers and planners involves 
ensuring that scarce economic resources are put to their best use.  
understanding the concept of fragility plays a pivotal part in reaching 
that understanding.
fragility, like many other systems—particularly information technology 
(it) systems—works on the concept of subjects and objects. Subjects are 
those entities that seek to exploit the services (or capacity) offered by the 
object. Objects, on the other hand, are those entities that deliver some 
good or service to the overall system. of course, something may act as  
the object in one pairing and the subject in another pairing—they are not  
exclusive in nature. for example, the driver of a car may be considered 
the subject in the relationship between the driver and the car, while 
the car is considered the object. the car may become the subject when 
  looking at the relationship between the car and a bridge, insofar as the 
car (subject) is now exploiting a service that the bridge (object) provides, 
namely, getting the car from Point a to Point B.
Subjects and objects can be measured using a consistent framework.  
the subject is measured in terms of the demand that it puts on the 
  overall system, and these measurements are contextual. if the need 
for more space is the core issue, then the measurement system for the 
  subject will likely seek to quantify how much space is required as its  
core criterion. if the issue rotates around the number of transactions 
per unit of time, the subject will likely be measured in terms of how long 
it takes to process a single transaction. objects, on the other hand, are 
  measured based upon the capacity that they deliver into the system. 
  object   measurements will generally focus on the performance of the 
  object and how it relates to the demands placed on it by all the subjects 
that seek to exploit its services.
the chance that the object will fail in terms of its relationship to the 
  subject can be viewed in terms of three perspectives. the first, referred  
to as designed fragility can trace its roots to reliability engineering. the  
McDougall: Fragility: The Next Wave in Critical Infrastructure Protection
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009Journal of Strategic Security
92
engineer designs something so that it can be assured to work, given certain 
stringent conditions, a certain percentage of the time. naturally, the more 
grave the impact associated with failure (both in terms of consequence 
and potential liability), the greater the assurance will need to be—and the 
lower the level of designed fragility. one might even express this in terms 
of fragility being the difference between all possible outcomes and those 
that the engineer can assure will be positive outcomes (f = 100 − r).
the reliability of the infrastructure can change as operating   conditions 
change. the engineer has assured the reliability of the   infrastructure 
based on certain operating conditions. Where the infrastructure is 
  operating outside of those conditions, the engineer makes no such 
promises. operating conditions may include factors such as temperature, 
  humidity, chemical exposure, age, and so on. for those that have looked 
at Safety Management Systems, this concept will be reasonably familiar 
as the gradual operation of equipment outside of acceptable parameters 
is generally accepted as increasing the risk of failure and, consequently, 
hazard to the operator and those nearby. this natural fragility reflects 
the conditions present in the real world as opposed to the engineering 
environment.
the conditions that impact natural fragility can be episodic in nature. 
Seasons change as do daily conditions. Hence, cyclical fragility describes 
natural fragility and its behavior over periods of time. not all natural 
fragility will operate in cycles; sometimes the fragility is more linear in 
nature. natural fragility is defined in terms of two elements. first, there 
is the change in natural fragility that happens along a curve over time.  
at particular times on the curve, certain conditions may be more 
  prevalent and, as a result, the overall fragility of the system may   either 
suffer or improve. the second element is the wear and tear on the 
  infrastructure as it is subjected to repeated strains. imagine a cycle of 
freezing and thawing water. as the water freezes, it expands,   putting 
pressure on things around it, like the sides of a container. as the 
  temperature rises, however, the ice melts, leaving an empty spot that can 
be filled with a larger amount of water.
the following rules extend from the relationship of subjects and objects. 
the following rules might be called the local fragility rules:
●    the design fragility of an object is the difference between the   total 
population of outcomes less those that assured through the 
  engineering associated with the system (f = 100 − r).
●    the natural fragility of an object can be described as either  
the lowest number of desirable outcomes or where  
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fragility(design) × factor(environmental impact). this can also be described in terms 
of fragility (natural) = fragility(design) × factor(loss of effectiveness due to environment).
●    the cyclical fragility of an object can be described in terms of the 
curve defined by the maximum natural fragility over a period of time 
where the conditions associated with the natural fragility repeat 
  themselves.
from a physical infrastructure perspective, these rules have two 
  significant impacts. the first is that it is not enough for the   asset 
  protection specialist to calculate impact simply based upon the 
  engineering specifications of the target (the object). in short, a more 
comprehensive, intelligent assessment of the infrastructure will need 
to be made to account for fragility. the core challenge here will be 
  identifying the knowledge sets that apply to the infrastructure and then 
building the capacity of the assessor or, in some cases, the assessment 
team. the second element is that this requires much more awareness 
regarding the impacts of   decisions and how those decisions will affect the 
infrastructure. if we change the conditions that surround the object, we 
have to understand how that will change the object and whether or not 
this will have an impact on how the subject and the object relate. this 
will be a core   challenge for planners as it would necessitate maintaining 
running   inventories of their infrastructure points and understanding how 
their decisions would affect those on categorical, if not individual, levels.
understanding the relationship between these concepts is vital to the 
understanding of how fragility works at the local level. the local level, 
sometimes referred to as the tactical level, is the foundation of the 
  strategic infrastructure system at the regional and even national level. 
this consideration is often neglected when one becomes preoccupied 
with the protection of the local facility. What needs to be understood  
and accounted for is how the local facility or infrastructure contributes  
to the overall performance of the system.
recall that the concept of capacity and demand was touched upon earlier 
in the description of the subject (demanding services) and the object  
(delivering capacity). in a system operating at full capacity, these two  
elements exist in a delicate balance that cannot be disrupted without 
causing some level of disruption (D = c). Where the capacity of the 
system exceeds the demands placed on it and depending upon the 
  configuration of the network, the redundancy of the system allows  
the system to respond to some kinds of disruption by simply rerouting  
to new routes and locations where there is surplus capacity available  
(D < c). on the other hand, where there is more demand than capacity 
(c > D), a situation exists where not all subjects’ demands can be met. 
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at that point, the subject must either reroute itself (to find a new source 
of capacity), remove itself from the system, or become idle within the 
system. We have all seen this situation arise during traffic jams.
the balance of demand and capacity will determine what state subjects 
can remain at within the overall system. When the objects are adequately 
meeting demands, the subjects will continue to carry on through the 
system or continue to remain active until they have reached or achieved 
their ultimate goals. a subject can be described as being in an active state 
when the subject is continuing to attempt to exploit capacity. Subjects 
caught in a situation where there is no capacity to be exploited will 
find themselves entering a neutral or passive state. in this context, the 
subject is waiting for some surplus capacity so that it can be exploited. 
What needs to be clear, however, is that the passive subject is occupying 
  capacity (as opposed to just space) within the system.
let us apply these principles and concepts to a more concrete example—
the surface network for the city of ottawa, canada. in this context, let us 
assume that the surface system in any given area can handle 1000 cars 
per minute on the highway and 100 cars per minute in the downtown 
core. Where there is one driver per car, then one might assume that 
the two aspects of the system can handle 1000 drivers and 100 drivers 
respectively. When there are 500 cars on the highway, there are 500 cars 
worth of capacity to be exploited. the system can continue to function 
and the cars remain active, occasionally changing lanes to exploit areas 
that appear to have more capacity. When there are 1000 cars   operating 
in the system, the system is operating at capacity. any new vehicle 
  attempting to enter the system may cause another vehicle already in 
the system to slow, or even stop, meaning that the system quickly stalls 
behind the blockage. if, as the result of the introduction of this   additional 
vehicle, an accident occurs, then many more subjects in the system 
become inactive, essentially entering a passive state. this passive state 
occupies more and more capacity (as defined in terms of space), until the 
subjects have taken up all the available capacity and the system begins 
to stall. Where this becomes even more challenging is when the subjects 
occupy an object, move into a passive state and then force the object to 
enter a passive state. this begins to approach the challenges associated 
with gridlock that occurs when vehicles simply have no alternatives or  
capacity to exploit, fill up the overall grid, and then become the 
  disruption themselves.
now consider a system that has the capacity to handle 4000 persons 
traveling down a particular route. let’s assume a case where   carpooling 
means that four persons occupy one vehicle. this means that the   overall 
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ratio of persons to cars has increased to four to one. Mass transit, such 
as busses, increases this ratio again, but on two fronts. the bus can 
handle forty persons. on the other hand, a bus only requires the space 
of   approximately four vehicles. first, the ratio of passengers (subjects) 
to the bus (object) has increased to forty to one. this does not reflect the 
true value, however, because the bus takes up more than a car’s allocated 
space—it takes up approximately four times that amount. that means 
that the space allocated would normally hold four cars and, therefore, 
sixteen persons. the bottom line conclusion is that the mass transit 
system has improved the system’s capacity by approximately six cars 
(forty minus sixteen split with four persons per vehicle). in short, the bus 
has shifted the ratio of subjects to objects, creating a condition by which 
many can exploit a single entity in the overall system.
as a result of this analysis, we can apply certain rules when looking  
at the interaction between subjects and objects. these are the  
following:
●    Chaining Sequence Rule—given Subject a: object B and Subject B: 
object c, then where object B and Subject B are the same entity, one 
can infer Subject a: object c.
●    Efficiency Rule—the efficiency of a system can be improved by  
increasing the Subject: object.
at the regional level, the relationship between the subject and the object 
has a logical limit. this limit is based on the maximum efficiency of 
the subject and nature of the object. consider the bus example. in this 
example, we have increased the efficiency of the subject from one to 
four (carpooling) to ten (the bus—forty in the space of four). We have 
not changed the nature of the object—it can still only handle a certain 
  number of transactions per unit of time (4000 cars per route). in this 
case, the subject (bus) has become more efficient, but the ratio between 
the subjects (cars) to the object has not improved.
this situation leads to a condition where the capacity of the system 
gradually becomes fragile. this is because the system cannot respond 
  effectively to the loss of the efficiency within the system. When looking  
at our example in ottawa, we have to consider an aspect of cyclic   fragility 
that occurred as part of the labor negotiation cycle. in   December 2008, 
the object failed when the union went on strike,   essentially   dropping the 
value of the subject from forty persons/four cars or ten   persons per car 
down to four units in a single car. in essence,   approximately twenty-four 
person-trips worth of demand were suddenly forced back into the system, 
the equivalent of six cars per bus lost.
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the result of this impact depends upon two functions. the first   function 
is how the system can adjust its rate of performance in response to the 
new demand. in this case, the surface road system is not something 
that one can add capacity (infrastructure) quickly—it takes time to 
build roads. With respect to the amount of infrastructure available, the 
  transportation system follows physically fixed routes that are necessary 
to the operation of the mode of conveyance. the question is not, however, 
about whether or not new routes can be created, but whether or not they 
can be adequately controlled. additional flexibility could also be inputted 
to the transportation system (to an extent) in the context of aviation and 
marine industries, thereby altering the nature of the system. in essence, 
the first function describes the ability of the network to create and add 
capacity within the system so that the system can rebalance itself, which 
is a pure resiliency function.
Where the first function cannot be achieved, the second function must 
come into play. the second function is the attempt to locate and reroute 
the demand that is not being met into other avenues that offer a surplus 
of capacity. this may involve alternate routes, the use of side streets, 
and a host of other means—the important part is that the   infrastructure 
has untapped capacity and can direct disrupted demand onto that 
  capacity. this premise is also not new; it is the foundation of intelligent 
  transportation Systems that attempt to route around traffic jams, etc.
Where the system cannot achieve these two goals, however, the next layer 
of fragility comes into play. this fragility is based upon the   fragmentation 
and potential dissolution of networks. consider that when a node or a 
conduit is completely filled (demand meets or exceeds capacity), then it 
cannot deliver any more service. these are essentially pockets within the 
system and, depending on what capacity they offer to the system, one 
will find that the impact begins to cascade upstream (where the system 
becomes clogged) and downstream (where the expected resources and so 
on fail to arrive). this is common within the airline industry, particularly 
during bad weather, and one only has to look at a major hub during that 
bad weather to see the breadth and depth of the impact.
this impact is again based upon the capacity at the disrupted points and 
the connections between the various nodes. When the nodes are affected, 
the conduits between those nodes are all affected, following the same 
principles as a single point of failure from the Business continuity domain. 
When only one of many conduits between nodes is affected, the system may 
be able to adjust accordingly (such as we would see where aircraft and ships 
are routed to new airways or shipping lanes in response to bad weather). 
What should be clear to the reader, however, is that there is a level of 
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dependence and independence in how this impact operates. if the node 
is configured with set points and does not have the ability to   reprioritize 
or adjust its own configuration (such as paid gates at an airport); then 
the individual lines or conduits of disruption function independently of 
each other. this results in a condition where the sum of disruptions must 
be taken into account. on the other hand, where a node has the ability to 
adjust and prioritize   accordingly, then the calculation of disruption moves 
much more in line with those associated with   dependent events.
consider this example; if each service point held by the node is firmly  
and irrevocably allocated to one family of lines, then only those   service 
points need to be disrupted for the whole family of lines to be   disrupted. 
if,   however, there are clauses and similar mechanisms built in that 
  allow for the organization to move a disrupted line from one   family 
into   another group of service points (likely with a cost), then the   final 
failure of the event is not determined by whether or not all of one 
  administrative group of service points are disrupted. at the tactical level, 
the   organization needs to arrange its service points and its contracts 
to prevent a single incident from affecting all service lines to allow for 
  flexibility in its   operational context.
fragility, at this point, indicates the potential for fragmentation and we 
must, therefore, take into account the risk of disruption looking at both 
the infrastructure side of the equation and also the administrative side 
of the equation. Where all elements are vulnerable to a certain kind of 
attack, for instance, and there are no other options available, then the 
system is fragile. at the regional level, if there is only one option available 
that can meet all services, this local or tactical fragility can quickly affect 
the regional fragility—meaning that the regional system is vulnerable to  
a single attack at a certain point.
finally, by looking at how the capacity lost as a result of that disruption 
affects the overall system—movement to and through—we can calculate 
the disruptions due to fragmentation and dissolution. fragmentation 
occurs at key points that segregate or connect the various nodes of a 
  network. these might be referred to as the hubs in the   transportation 
system. Depending upon whether or not the physical, procedural, 
  technical, and psychological measures are in place to connect behind 
those nodes (such as a couple of airports with the correct runways, 
landing systems, communications systems, trained personnel, etc), the 
system will cut away from the network. this leads to fragmentation.
fragmentation and its associated impacts eventually lead to a situation 
where demand in the system cannot locate any reasonable route by which 
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it can accomplish its goals. When this happens, the system gradually fills 
and then collapses under its own weight. essentially, it is overwhelmed 
by a shift in the demand to capacity ratio. the end result is a condition 
where the pressure in the system has to be relieved to such a point that 
it can restart its operations and generate the capacity necessary to meet 
demand.
fragility, in a networked transportation system operates across all 
three levels: local, regional, and national or strategic. the strategic and 
  regional levels are founded upon the capacity and vulnerabilities  inherent 
at the local levels and then exacerbated through regional and national 
disconnects, the lack of redundancy, and similar factors. at the local 
level, an understanding of fragility must be combined with the need to 
conduct appropriate impact assessments in addition to   understanding 
the vulnerabilities associated with each input that allows for work to 
  proceed so that the potential capacity to be delivered can actually be 
communicated or delivered into the system. failing to understand the 
concept of fragility at the local level can lead to a misinterpretation of 
impacts by failing to understand how the infrastructure delivers capacity 
within in the broader regional or national context.
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